Talk:The Kashmir Files/Archive 11

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Alexander Evans under question

So, we are finally at a point where we have to evaluate the claim of "conspiracy theory" advanced by Alexander Evans. There are two paragraphs on p.21, which state:

Most KPs believe that they were forced out of the Kashmir Valley; whether by Pakistan and the militant groups it backed, or by Kashmiri Muslims as a community. Representing the latter variant, Pyarelal Kaul contends that the Pandit departure was a clear case of communal intimidation by Muslims, designed to expel Hindus from the Valley. Mosques 'were used as warning centres. Threatening the Hindus and conveying to them what terrorists and many Muslims of Kashmir wanted to achieve.'[23: Kashmir—Trail and Travail, 56-57] According to Anil Maheswari, the Pandit community was forced to leave the Valley.[24: Crescent over Kashmir, 80-85]

Pakistani policy is the root cause, according to Vijay Dhar: 'In 1990, Kashmiri Pandits were forced to abandon the Valley, because in the eyes of Pakistani strategists of the proxy war, they represented India in Kashmir'.[25: The Hindustan Times, 17 February 1997] Drawing on an Indian Defence Review assessment, Maroof Raza describes the episode as 'a deliberate policy of ethnic cleansing'.[26: Wars and No Peace over Kashmir, 74] The current governor, Giresh Saxena, agrees.[27]

These are the two conspiracy theories according to Fowler&fowler. The citations are a mixed bag. Pyarelal Kaul and Anil Maheswari seem to be arguing that all Kashmiri Muslims were responsible. The rest of them placing the onus on Pakistan or the militants it supported. I call them mixed bag, because Kashmiri Pandit sources and security experts have been mixed together. Maroof Raza, for example, has done extensive amount of work on counter-insurgency. Manoj Joshi, whose book was published in 1999 and has been cited extensively since, doesn't appear in the paper.

The mosque broadcasts which appear prominently in Pandit narratives are mentioned only once in this paper, in the above passage. Evans hasn't dug into it or tried to find out how the broadcasts came about. Toronto Star interviewed a refugee in Delhi and they published:

At night, Muslim mosques broadcast messages from loudspeakers telling all Hindus to leave Kashmir. "Leave your ladies here," the broadcasts ordered. "We want Kashmir without you but leave your ladies here."[1]

The disinterest in the mosque broadcasts is a serious deficiency of this paper in my opinion.

Then Evans continues:

While elements of the militancy certainly had an agenda of deliberate and enforced Islamisation, large segments of the militancy (the JKLF, for example) actively claimed to speak for all Kashmiris regardless of religion. Despite this, the bulk of Hindu departures took place during the phase when the JKLF was in the ascendant. In early 1990, the pro-Pakistan element of the Kashmir militancy was in its formative phase. The pro-Pakistan militant organisation Hizbul Mujahadeen had only been going a few months; the pro-independence JKLF determined much of the militant agenda. Islamist leaders, among them Syed Andrabi of Jamaat-e-Tulba, considered KPs to be traitors and agents of India.[28: Syed Andrabi, interview] Their fierce rhetoric had an impact on an already jittery community; the acts of violence that accompanied it could be seen as a deliberate attempt to drive out the Pandits.

This might have been a fair summary of the state of knowledge in 2002 (which has been described wihout any citations), but it is now badly out of date. A lot more information has come out after 2002. Pakistan-based journalists or security experts such as Arif Jamal, Amir Rana, and Amir Mir have published prominent accounts, which have been cited by various security scholars. I wrote the Hizbul Mujahideen page based on these accounts, which you can consult for more detail. Here are some interesting bits:

  • Operating under the JKLF banner were also a number of Islamist jihadi groups that owed loyalty to Jamaat-e-Islami: a group called "Zia Tigers" operating since 1987, "Al-Hamza" since 1988, "Hizbul Ansar" led by Muzaffar Shah, a largest and best organized group called "Ansarul Islam", and a subsidiary of it called "Al-Badr". According to Arif Jamal, "this vast network of jihadi groups worked within the JKLF for many months; they were among the most active members of the insurgency."
  • The ISI and the Jamaat-e-Islami of Azad Kashmir were intent on bringing Hizbul Mujahideen under the control of Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir. A meeting was arranged in Kathmandu on 14 January 1990, with participants from the Jamaat organisations from Pakistan, Azad Kashmir and the Kashmir Valley. The Kashmiri Jamaat was resistant to direct involvement in the insurgency, saying that it would destroy the organisation and open it to Indian assault. But Syed Ali Shah Geelani dramatically appeared when the negotiations stalled and pushed the Jamaat into supporting the insurgency. Having decided to participate in the militancy, states Arif Jamal, the Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir moved to "decisive action, activating a decade of planning".

So, on 14 January 1990, the Jamaat agreed to take over Hizbul Mujahideen and activated "a decade of planning". I see a direct link between this event and the mosque broadcasts that began on 19 January. Of course, we don't have any evidence. Nobody has provided any information about who organised the mosque broadcasts. But it is known that they were tape-recorded programmes which were distributed all over the valley and played from the same date. So, this didn't just happen overnight. It was pre-planned.

The significance of 19 January is quite clear. That was when Farooq Abdullah resigned and the Governor's Rule was proclaimed. The fight was now going to be directly between the militants and the Indian government, with no unwanted intermediaries. The 19 January was also the day when the Srinagar police chiefs decided to conduct a house-to-house search for militants. But the mosque broadcasts preempted them by hours.

Rahul Pandita describes what they heard that night:

We were still wondering what would happen next when a slogan we heard left us in no doubt. I remember Ma began to tremble like a leaf when we heard it. ‘Assi gacchi panu’nuy Pakistan, batav rostuy, batenein saan.’ The crowd wanted to turn Kashmir into Pakistan, without the Pandit men, but with their women. They’ll come and finish us. It is just a matter of minutes now, we think. Ma rushed to the kitchen and returned with a long knife. It was her father’s. ‘If they come, I will kill her,’ she looked at my sister. ‘And then I will kill myself. And you see what you two need to do.’ Father looked at her in disbelief. But he didn’t utter a word.[2]

Is this still a "conspiracy theory", Fowler&fowler? The Pandits just imagined all this and left out of fear because there was an "open revolt"? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:45, 7 May 2022 (UTC)

  • We are not talking about whether they did or did not experience fear? We are talking about characterizations of "Genocide" and "Ethnic Cleansing." You may read a much more nuanced and scholarly account in the lead of Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 15:12, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
  • What is it you did not understand about:

    During the period of substantial migration, the insurgency was being led by a group calling for a secular and independent Kashmir, but there were also growing Islamist factions envisioning an Islamic state.[3][4][5] Although their numbers of dead and injured were low,[6] the Pandits, who believed that Kashmir's culture was tied to India's,[7][8] experienced fear and panic set off by targeted killings of some high-profile officials among their ranks and public calls for independence among the insurgents.[9] The accompanying rumours and uncertainty together with the absence of guarantees for their safety by India's federal government might have been the latent causes of the exodus.[10][11]

    to waste time with meanderings? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 15:30, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
    (edit conflict) Evans never admits that the Pandits were driven out or were asked to leave. He believes that they left on their own accord out of "fear". -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:34, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
    >>> "Evans never admits that the Pandits were driven out or were asked to leave. He believes that they left on their own accord out of "fear"
    He says,

    might KPs have been terrified by uncertainty as much as by direct threats? There was collective unease at the situation as it unfolded. While the numbers of dead and injured were low, militant attacks between 1988 and 1990 induced panic within the Pandit community. There was widespread fear and a sense of impending trouble, fuelled by extremist propaganda on both sides. By late March 1990, the ASKPC (All India Kashmiri Pandit Conference) was appealing to the administration to assist Pandits in ‘shifting to Jammu’. No matter what designs lay behind these attacks, KPs were bound to feel uneasy. Legitimate fear encouraged KPs to leave the Valley they were born in for other parts of India. Once it became clear that the government could not protect senior KP officials—and would pay their salaries in absentia—many other KPs in state employment decided to move.

    Fowler&fowler«Talk» 16:11, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
    By the way, we are not talking about "fear". We are not talking about "genocide". We are talking about "conspiracy theories", which you and you alone want to add to the lead paragraph. Please don't attempt to sidetrack the issue. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:48, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
    If we are not talking about fear, why are you bringing it up?
    >>> which you and you alone want to add to the lead paragraph
    Did I add it? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 16:13, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
    You waste community time with a long aside of third-rate sources, the scholars of Toronto Star among them; I reply with best WP can aspire to, and you are accusing me of being unable to paraphrase Alexander Evans Fowler&fowler«Talk» 16:15, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
    It doesn't matter what rate the sources are. Facts are facts. Evans ignored the facts and branded something as a "conspiracy theory". His proposition is debunked by the evidence various sources have presented. Please say good bye to the "conspiracy theory" proposition. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:30, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
    So the founders and builders of Wikipedia were wasting time formulating WP:SOURCETYPES which says, "When available, academic and peer-reviewed publications, scholarly monographs, and textbooks are usually the most reliable sources." and wasting more time formulating WP:TERTIARY which states: Many introductory undergraduate-level textbooks are regarded as tertiary sources because they sum up multiple secondary sources. Policy: Reliable tertiary sources can help provide broad summaries of topics that involve many primary and secondary sources and may help evaluate due weight, especially when primary or secondary sources contradict each other. And the major historians of modern India, Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, were also wasting time in their A Concise History of Modern India, Cambridge University Press, 2012, read around the world, and cited 850 times on Google Scholar, when they say, The imposition of leaders chosen by the centre, with the manipulation of local elections, and the denial of what Kashmiris felt was a promised autonomy boiled over at last in the militancy of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, a movement devoted to political, not religious, objectives. The Hindu Pandits, a small but influential elite community who had secured a favorable position, first under the maharajas and then under the successive Congress governments, and who propagated a distinctive Kashmiri culture that linked them to India, felt under siege as the uprising gathered force. Upwards of 100,000 of them left the state during the early 1990s; their cause was quickly taken up by the Hindu right. As the government sought to locate ‘suspects’ and weed out Pakistani ‘infiltrators’, the entire population was subjected to a fierce repression. By the end of the 1990s, the Indian military presence had escalated to approximately one soldier or paramilitary policeman for every five Kashmiris, and some 30,000 people had died in the conflict.

    Fowler&fowler«Talk» 16:46, 7 May 2022 (UTC)

    And Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh were also wasting time when they wrote in their widely read and cited (300 times on Google Scholar) Partition of India, Cambridge University Press, 2009:[12]

    The modern history of Jammu and Kashmir is normally dated from the Treaty of Lahore (1846) which Sikh rule in the province and marked the beginning of a Hindu monarchy that lasted almost a century. During this period the Hindu elite established an ethnically and economically stratified society in which the status of the vast majority of Muslims was reduced to that of a heavily exploited and servile peasantry ... (Farooq Abdullah's) efforts to establish an all-India oppositional front for more autonomy resulted, first, in his dismissal, and then, in his return to power in alliance with Congress in the rigged assembly elections of June 1987. It was these elections, and the denial of the growing support of the Muslim United Front, that triggered the uprising in the Kashmir valley from 1987 onwards. Thereafter the separatist groups (Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and Hizbul Mujahideen) transformed decades of ethnic oppression into a generalised uprising against the Indian state. Between 1990 and 1995, 25,000 people were killed in Kashmir, almost two-thirds by Indian armed forces. Kashmirs put the figure at 50,000. In addition, 150,000 Kashmiri Hindus fled the valley to settle in the Hindu-majority region of Jammu. In 1991, Amnesty International estimated that 15,000 people were being detained in the state without trial.

    Fowler&fowler«Talk» 17:17, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
    Metcalf and Metcalf haven't called anything a "conspiracy theory". So they are hardly relevant to the discussion. The second sentence of their paragraph states, The year 1989 marked the beginning of a continuing insurgency, fuelled by covert support from Pakistan. So I doubt if they would label any accusation of Pakistan as a "conspiracy theory".
    I very well know that the Pandit narratives are not favoured by scholars. But Evans is alone in calling them "conspiracy theories". I am saying no to that, because I see it as a violation of WP:NPOV. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:27, 7 May 2022 (UTC)r
    So, if Barbara D. Metcalf, former president of the American Historical Association and Thomas R. Metcalf the Sara Kailath Professor of South Asia at University of California, Berkeley are putting their reputation on the line by saying, "the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, a movement devoted to political, not religious, objectives." And some (not all) Kashmiri Pandits are saying they were driven out because of their religion, what is it if not a conspiracy theory? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 17:36, 7 May 2022 (UTC)

There is no support for the bit about "conspiracy theories." F&f do not seem to understand that such labels are very contentious and requires multiple sources which do not need to be synthesized. Even if I accept his reading of Evans (hardly a scholar with towering reputation), the situation remains same.

However, I do not think Evans (or any other scholar) can be blamed for not shedding much light on the mosque broadcasts. No local daily covered anything of relevance. Declassified IB notes etc. contain nada. Ditto as to FIRs lodged by KPs. Kashmir had extensive military installation throughout towns — at least, you shall expect them to have kept some record? Nothing as well. Still, the claims are not outright rejected due to the sheer penetration of militants etc. into local administration who are not expected to be much conducive to logging such gory details.

So, we are left to rely on public memory but to no avail — Pandit migrants and their Muslim neighbors seem to have inhabited parallel universes during those fateful nights. One cannot really seek to decipher the "truth" of these episodes; leading media houses in Kashmir has commissioned investigations into the episode, only to return with a "He said, She said" narrative. The best stance to take, somewhat governed by political correctness, is put forward by Sanjay Kak. TrangaBellam (talk) 17:39, 7 May 2022 (UTC)

But it wasn't contentious until the director said "Boo," and some Wikipedians (in the estimation of the Indian media) went running like Chicken Little Exceptional claims run both ways, the fact that the movie is about to be released in the digital media, where Wikipedia's criticism becomes more important, any changes in WP longstanding wording will require exceptional support in the sources to offset Conflicts of Interest. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 17:43, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
And what are we to make of Chitralekha Zutshi, a Pandit herself, who says this was not the first exodus, in her widely read and cited, Languages of Belonging, Oxford 2003:

Since a majority of the landlords were Hindu, the (land) reforms (of 1950) led to a mass exodus of Hindus from the state. ... The unsettled nature of Kashmir's accession to India, coupled with the threat of economic and social decline in the face of the land reforms, led to increasing insecurity among the Hindus in Jammu, and among Kashmiri Pandits, 20 per cent of whom had emigrated from the Valley by 1950."

Fowler&fowler«Talk» 17:53, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
Were the groveling Muslim peasants putting a gun to their heads in 1950 or was it the profit motive? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 17:54, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
Sorry they didn't have guns. I meant rusted sickles. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 18:04, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
any changes in WP longstanding wording will require exceptional support in the sources to offset Conflicts of Interest - TryKid has already urged you to stop insinuating the same thing over and over, and if you yet persist, we will be discussing our COIs at AE. TrangaBellam (talk) 18:49, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
So if Kak says,

His ethnography amidst the residents of the camps leads him to conclude that for the Pandits it was “the overall deterioration in law and order, alongside selective assassinations and the content of demonstrations” that made them feel unwanted in Kashmir. The departures continued all through the ‘90s, and by the end of that decade, the Pandits were all but gone. (Kashmir’s Sikhs remained, and do so till today. But that is another story).

and Datta says earlier:

By referencing the Jewish Holocaust, the Pandits can go beyond existing frames in the region and thereby claim their experience to be unique in comparison with other Indians as well as revealing the creative potential of such efforts. The parallels also allow for the adoption of a recognizable (p.179) identity of catastrophic loss and ‘blameless’ victimhood.4 Such a parallel is, ironically, not recognized by poorer and less educated migrants for whom the Jewish Holocaust is an unknown and foreign event.

The Jews did not drive out in their cars in the dead of night because of perceived deterioration of law and order. They were rounded up because of their religion and ethnicity and murdered en masse, at least 6 million to be sure. So, combining Kak and Datta, what is the attempt at identifying with the Jews by the upper crust Pandits if not a conspiracy theory? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 18:24, 7 May 2022 (UTC)

The mosque broadcasts have been corroborated, though not in full detail:

  • During our stay in Srinagar, almost every night we heard slogans and speeches from the mosque calling upon the people to protest against repression. The failure of the democratic and secular forces to solve the long standing grievances of the people seems to have paved the way for the emergence of Islam as an alternative source of inspiration and motivation for the disgruntled masses. Judging by the display of pictures of Khomeini in the streets of Srinagar, we felt that the impact of the Iranian type militant Islamic fundamentalism also could not be ruled out.[13]
  • I told them quite clearly that it was hardly surprising that Pandits were apprehensive. Any minority would be if places of worship of the majority were continually used to blare strident threats to them over loudspeakers—as every mosque was at the time—and if prominent members of their community had been murdered. (I learned later that these inflammatory sermons and their reverberating public applause were audio recordings circulated to mosques to be played over loudspeakers at prayer time.) I also told them that such use of a sacred place was no less than desecration and contempt for the faith.[14]

-- Kautilya3 (talk) 18:24, 7 May 2022 (UTC)

You are wasting time. WP:SOURCETYPES and WP:TERTIARY is policy Fowler&fowler«Talk» 18:26, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
I do not find Ref 1 to be supportive of the claims; that the mosque blared calls for freedom from Indian occupation etc. are well-corroborated and undisputed. See R. Vaishnovi's memoirs for example. TrangaBellam (talk) 18:52, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
But all these discussions are a time-waste; to reiterate what I said, There is no support for the bit about "conspiracy theories." [..] [S]uch labels are very contentious and requires multiple sources which do not need to be synthesized. Even if I accept his [F&f's] reading of Evans (hardly a scholar with towering reputation), the situation remains same.
If F&F wishes to include "conspiracy theory", I request that he open a RfC. Else, I will open one. TrangaBellam (talk) 18:54, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
Also, it is unhelpful when you keep accusing me of being some kind of a holdout. When I came to this page in late March, it had become a hotbed of bashing India's ruling party, the BJP, the Hindu nationalists, the Hindutva brigade, and what have you. It had two paragraphs and here is how the second read when I arrived on the page after being requested to stem the rot. It is not the first time I've been asked to do that on Wikipedia.

The film has been endorsed, promoted and provided with tax-free status in multiple states by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party,[15][16] leading to significant audiences and commercial success.[17] Critical reception has been mixed,[15] the cinematography and the performances of the cast were described to be compelling,[21] but the film faced accusations of historical revisionism,[24] and of being propaganda aligned with the ruling party,[27] aiming to foster prejudice against Muslims.[29] Supporters have praised the film for showing what they say is a part of Kashmir's human rights history that has been overlooked,[28] while theatres across India have witnessed hate speeches including calls for killing Muslims, often provoked by activists of the ruling party and related Hindutva organisations.[30][31]

So, let us count, shall we? The three long sentences had four mentions of ruling party, Bharatiya Janata Party, or Hindutva. In my fifth or sixth edit, I wrote in the edit summary, "You can't bring in the ruling political party at every step in the lead. Less is More. Removing one of three mentions in the lead. The leads needs a brief plot for the uninitiated reader. Someone will need to write it. Without it the lead begins to read like a rant. Please fix this."
Would you like me to examine the article's history and count how many edits each of you had made before that and how often you had waged the struggle to reduce gratuitous mention of the BJP etc? So, please don't attempt to teach me hypocritical lessons in cultural relativism. I have made the lead much more balanced, taken out most of the gratuitous anti-Hindu nationalist garbage.
I have more productive things to do on Wikipedia. When you have come up with a coherent argument, let me know. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 19:14, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
I have not got the remotest of idea about what are you waxing eloquent about but I will be opening a RfC tomorrow to put an end to this charade. TrangaBellam (talk) 20:10, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
Charade? Please first open the discussion at WT:INB that you are telling others to open about Rima Hooja at Talk:Maharana Pratap Fowler&fowler«Talk» 23:27, 7 May 2022 (UTC)
Thereafter, when you open the vaunted RfC, make sure the version 2 is my version 2 at Talk:The_Kashmir_Files#Version_2_of_F&f, not the WP:STATUSQUO version under which we shall strive on unconquerable until the RfC is resolved many weeks later. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 03:31, 8 May 2022 (UTC)
Do include questions on the inclusion of criticism in the first paragraph in light of FILMLEAD and using "fictionalisation" instead of fictional if possible, please. They both seem as intractable. TryKid[dubiousdiscuss] 00:04, 8 May 2022 (UTC)
They both seem intractable? How so? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 00:28, 8 May 2022 (UTC)
How does FILMLEAD apply to Holocaust (miniseries)? Fictional or fictionalized? The lead there says, "Holocaust (1978) is an American four-part television miniseries which explores the Holocaust from the perspectives of the fictional Weiss family of Jews in Germany and that of a rising member of the SS, who gradually becomes a war criminal. Holocaust highlights numerous events which occurred up to and during World War II, such as Kristallnacht, the creation of Jewish ghettos, and later, the use of gas chambers. Although the miniseries won several awards and received positive reviews, it was also criticized. Holocaust survivor and activist Elie Wiesel wrote in The New York Times that it was: "Untrue, offensive, cheap: as a TV production, the film is an insult to those who perished and to those who survived."
So if the director had made a Twitter post about "untrue," "cheap," "offensive," "insult," how would you be arguing? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 00:58, 8 May 2022 (UTC)
Their removal from the lead would be tractable or intractable? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 00:59, 8 May 2022 (UTC)
And the pride of Wikipedia the Featured Article F*CK, which opens with, The film argues that the word is an integral part of societal discussions about freedom of speech and censorship. It examines the term from perspectives which include art, linguistics, society and comedy, and begins with a segment from the 1965 propaganda film Perversion for Profit. Scholars and celebrities analyze perceptions of the word from differing perspectives. Journalist Sam Donaldson talks about the versatility of the word, and comedian Billy Connolly states it can be understood despite one's language or location. Musician Alanis Morissette comments that the word contains power because of its taboo nature. The film features the last recorded interview of author Hunter S. Thompson before his suicide. Scholars, including linguist Reinhold Aman, journalism analyst David Shaw and Oxford English Dictionary editor Jesse Sheidlower, explain the history and evolution of the word. Language professor Geoffrey Nunberg observes that the word's treatment by society reflects changes in our culture during the 20th century.
And how will you be applying FILMHIST dear @TryKid: to that opening paragraph? How many violations? If even one, if you don't think you are barking up the wrong tree (meant only metaphorically), don't you think your time is better served getting that article delisted at WP:FAR? , considering it is a WP Featured article, probably one of the most widely read? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 01:11, 8 May 2022 (UTC)
Fowler&fowler, there are no violations in either, indeed they might just prove my point. The first paragraph of the lead of Holocaust contains only the plot and no criticism of it, that only appears in the second paragraph, in line with FILMLEAD. The "fictional" is much better used there, talking of a fictional family, not a "fictional storyline". I would not object to a similar construction with a line about the film following a fictional Pandit family's fictional grandson "exploring" the Exodus.
And Fuck too, is in line with the Documentary section of MOS:FILM, and only gives a synopsis of the elements contained in the documentary itself, not the outside criticism of the material contained, which appears only in the third paragraph. Note that I might have mistakenly said "lead" when I meant the "first paragraph of the lead" in some places. Of course I don't disagree that the criticism must appear somewhere in the lead, since it's supposed to be a summary of the article itself, which must contain the criticism.
"Intractable" might not have been the right word to use. I meant that it would probably be much more efficient to simply do an RfC to obtain a consensus on these issues, since it would be extremely difficult to come to any consensus wording with simple discussion given the differing, hard-to-resolve interpretations of sources and policy between editors. Whether or not criticism should appear in the first paragraph, what words are justified in the criticism, whether the plot should be described as fictional, etc etc. regards, TryKid[dubiousdiscuss] 02:20, 8 May 2022 (UTC)
By the way I have experience in reviewing film FAs, Heart of Thomas being a recent one for which I did a peer-review and helped at the FAC. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 02:58, 8 May 2022 (UTC)
There is also Wikipedia:Featured article candidates/Akira Kurosawa/archive3 where I tried to help but was strapped for time but wasn't able to help enough, which is tragic as he is one of my favorites. And I'm sure there are at least a dozen others at FAC (quite a few I opposed). One Mullum Malarum, I rented the movie with English subtitles to rewrite the plot. It did not become an FA for which I feel guilty. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 03:17, 8 May 2022 (UTC)
I remember Mullum Malarum. That and Manilal Dwivedi were the two entertaining FACs on my watchlist with your reviews. I don't do a lot of work here, but I do enjoy watching others do it. TryKid[dubiousdiscuss] 03:27, 8 May 2022 (UTC)
What can I say, you win some, you lose some. Even with the ones you oppose, you do become familiar with the characters, the director's style, the movie.
For example in a trailer of The Kashmir Files there was a rousing rendition of Faiz Ahmad Faiz's song, which is hardly a Hindu nationalist song. So, although I know very little about the movie, the sum total of its effect might not be as straightforward as its detractors might be imagining. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 03:36, 8 May 2022 (UTC)
Anyway, past my bedtime.  :) Fowler&fowler«Talk» 03:38, 8 May 2022 (UTC)
But before I go, there was also the teenage Bollywood actress from the 70s whose name I'm blanking on but whose mother I determined to be Muslim that even the authors of the article did not know.
The FAC sadly became bogged down, but later someone contacted me; they had contacted relatives of the mother's sister who had migrated to Pakistan after the partition of India, and they supplied me the maiden last name (the nee) of the mother and the maternal grandparents, but by that time I had lost interest in the FAC Fowler&fowler«Talk» 03:49, 8 May 2022 (UTC)
Dimple Kapadia, that's a memorable one too. Maybe the real FAs were the friends we made along the way. :) regards, TryKid[dubiousdiscuss] 03:58, 8 May 2022 (UTC)

Good Heavens! It looks like we need an RfC to decide what the RfC should be! -- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:33, 8 May 2022 (UTC)

Citations

References

  1. ^ Hindus flee reign of fear in Kashmir, Toronto Star, 14 May 1990. ProQuest 436199360
  2. ^ Pandita, Rahul (2017), Our Moon Has Blood Clots: A Memoir of a Lost Home in Kashmir, Random House India, ISBN 9788184003901
  3. ^
    • Bose, Sugata; Jalal, Ayesha (2001), Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy, London and New York: Routledge, p. 226, ISBN 0-415-16951-8,  In 1989 and the early 1990s a popularly backed armed insurgency was orchestrated by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, which called for a secular and sovereign Kashmir. Kashmiri cultural and linguistic identity appeared to be more potent than Islamic aspirations or pro-Pakistan sentiment in the Vale of Kashmir. In time, however, the balance of firepower among the rebels shifted to the Hizbul Mujahideen, which received more support from Pakistan. The Indian state deployed more than 550,000 armed personnel in the early 1990s to severely repress the Kashmir movement.
    • Staniland, Paul (2014), Networks of Rebellion: Explaing Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, p. 73–76, ISBN 978-0-8014-5266-6,  The early years of JKLF activity, especially in 1988, involved coordinated, publicly symbolic strikes carried out by a relatively small number of fighters. Central control processes at this point were handled by the four original organizers. Crackdowns by the Indian government spurred mobilization, and "within two years, the previously marginal JKLF emerged as the vanguard and spearhead of a popular uprising in the Kashmir Valley against Indian rule. It dominated the first three years of the insurgency (1990-92)."! Even to the present day, "most commentators agree that among Muslims in the Valley, the JKLF enjoys considerable popular support." This was especially the case in the early 1990s, when contemporary observers argued that "the predominant battle cry in Kashmir is azadi (freedom) and not a merger with Pakistan'"and that "the JKLF, a secular militant group, is by far the most popular. The support for the JKLF was clearly substantial and greater than that of its militant contemporaries. ... In the early years of the war in Kashmir, the JKLF was the center of insurgency, but I will show later in this chapter how the social-institutional weakness of the organization made it vulnerable to targeting by the Indian leadership and dissention from local units. The Hizbul Mujahideen became the most robus organization in the fight in Kashmir. While its rise to dominance occurred after 1990, its mobilization during 1989–1991 through networks of the Jamaat-e-Islami laid the basis for an integrated organization that persisted until it shifted to a vanguard structure in the early to mid-2000s.
    • D'Mello, Bernard (2018), India After Naxalbari: Unfinished History, New York: Monthly Review Press, ISBN 978-158367-707-0,  The Kashmir question, centered on the right to national self-determination, cannot be dealt with here, but to cut a long story short, the last nail that the Indian political establishment hammered into the coffin of liberal-political democracy in Kashmir was the rigging of the 1987 state assembly elections there. The Muslim United Front would have electorally defeated the Congress Party-National Conferencecombine if the election had not been rigged. Many of the victims of this political fraud became the leaders of the Kashmir liberation (azaadi) movement. In the initial years, 1988-1992, the movement, led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), a secular organization, seemed to have unequivocally taken a stand for the independence of J&K from the occupation of India and Pakistan. But for this stand of the JKLF, it had to bear a heavy cost in terms of human lives and sustenance
    • Kumar, Radha; Puri, Ellora (2009), "Jammu and Kashmir: Frameworks for a Settlement", in Kumar, Radha (ed.), Negotiation Peace in Deeply Divided Societies: A Set of Simulations, New Delhi, Los Angeles and London: SAGE Publications, p. 292, ISBN 978-81-7829-882-5,  1990–2001: An officially estimated 10,000 Kashmiri youth crossover to Pakistan for training and procurement of arms. The Hizb-ul Mujahedeen (Hizb), which is backed by Pakistan, increases its strength dramatically. ISI favours the Hizb over the secular JKLF and cuts off financing to the JKLF and in some instances, provides intelligence to India against the JKLF. In April 1991, Kashmiris hold anti-Pakistan demonstrations in Srinagar following killing of a JKLF area commander by the Hizb. In 1992, Pakistani forces arrest 500 JKLF marchers led by Amanullah Khan in Pakistan held Kashmir (PoK) to prevent a bid to cross the border. India also uses intelligence from captured militants. JKLF militancy declines.
    • Phillips, David L. (8 September 2017), From Bullets to Ballots: Violent Muslim Movements in Transition, London and New York: Routledge, ISBN 9781351518857,  Consistent with the concept of Kashmiriyat, the JKLF was essentially a secular organization that aspired to the establishment of an independent Kashmir where both Muslims and Hindus would be welcome. This ideal is anathema to Pakistan-based fundamentalists as well as to Afghan and Arab fighters who care far less about Kashmiri self-determination than they do about establishing Pakistani rule and creating an Islamic caliphate in Srinagar.
    • Morton, Stephen (2008), Salman Rushdie: Fictions of Postcolonial Modernity, New British Fiction, Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 143–144, ISBN 978-1-4039-9700-5,  Yet if General Kachhwaha's military campaign of terror against Kashmiri Muslims in the Valley of Kashmir gives the lie to Nehru's legacy of secularism and tolerance by exposing the hegemonic and military power of India's Hindu majority, Rushdie's account of the secular nationalism of the Jammu Kashmir liberation front in Shalimar the Clown seems to embody what the postcolonial theorist Homi K. Bhabha calls subaltern secularism (Bhabha 1996). For the secular nationalism of the Jammu and Kashmir liberation front (JKLF) is precisely subaltern in the sense that it reflects the view of the Kashmiri people rather than the elite, a people 'of no more than five million souls, landlocked, preindustrial, resource rich but cash poor, perched thousands of feet up in the mountains'
    • Tompkins, Jr, Paul J. (2012), Crossett, Chuck (ed.), Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II, 1962–2009, Fort Bragg: United States Army Special Operations Command and The Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Laboratory, pp. 455–456, OCLC 899141935,  More than the relatively simple denial of civil and political rights that characterized the Kashmiri government for more than four decades, the events of 1990, when Governor Jagmohan and the Indian government stepped up their counterinsurgency efforts, developed into a pronounced human rights crisis"—there were rampant abuses such as unarmed protestors shot indiscriminately, arrests without trial, and the rape and torture of prisoners. Jagmohan whitewashed the security forces' role in human rights violations, laying the blame for atrocities at the feet of "terrorist forces. In February, he also dissolved the Assembly. Combined with the severe, indiscriminate harassment of the population, whereby all citizens were treated as potential suspects, the January massacre, and Jagmohan's draconian policies, support for the JKLF skyrocketed!"... However, it was JKLF, an ostensible secular, pro-independence movement, that dominated the field at the onse of the insurgency.
  4. ^
    • Lapidus, Ira A. (2014), A History of Islamic Societies (3 ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 720, ISBN 978-0-521-51430-9,  By the mid-1980s, however, trust between Delhi and local leaders had again broken down, and Kashmiris began a fully fledged armed insurgency led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front calling for an independent and secular Kashmir. As the military struggle went on, Muslim—Hindu antagonism rose; Kashmiris began to define themselves in Muslim terms. Pro-Muslim and pro-Pakistan sentiment became more important than secularism, and the leadership of the insurgency shifted to the Harakat and the Hizb ul-Mujahidin. To achieve its strategic objectives the Pakistani military and its intelligence services supported militant Islamist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, who attacked Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir and more recently attacked civilians in India. Saudi influences, more militant forms of Islam, and the backing of the Pakistani intelligence services gave the struggle in Kashmir the aura of a jihad. The fighting escalated with the deployment of more than 500,000 Indian soldiers to suppress the resistance.
    • Metcalf, Barbara D.; Metcalf, Thomas R. (2012), A Concise History of Modern India, Cambridge Concise Histories (3 ed.), Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 308–309, ISBN 978-1-107-02649-0,  The imposition of leaders chosen by the centre, with the manipulation of local elections, and the denial of what Kashmiris felt was a promised autonomy boiled over at last in the militancy of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, a movement devoted to political, not religious, objectives. ...As the government sought to locate 'suspects' and weed out Pakistani 'infiltrators', the entire population was subjected to a fierce repression. By the end of the 1990s, the Indian military presence had escalated to approximately one soldier or paramilitary policeman for every five Kashmiris, and some 30,000 people had died in the conflict.
    • Varma, Saiba (2020), The Occupied Clinic: Militarism and Care in Kashmir, Durham and London: Duke University Press, p. 27, ISBN 9781478009924, LCCN 2019058232,  In 1988, the JKLF, an organization with secular, leftist roots, waged a guerrilla war against Indian armed forces with the slogan Kashmir banega khudmukhtar (Kashmir will be independent). Other organizations, such as the Jama'at Islami and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), supported merging with Pakistan. In 1988, Kashmiris began an armed struggle to overthrow Indian rule. Because some armed groups received assistance from Pakistan, the Indian state glossed the movement as Pakistani-sponsored "cross-border terrorism," while erasing its own extralegal actions in the region. Part of India's claim over Kashmir rests on its self-image as a pluralistic, democratic, and secular country. However, many Kashmiris feel they have never enjoyed the fruits of Indian democracy, as draconian laws have been in place for decades. Further, many see Indian rule as the latest in a long line of foreign colonial occupations.
    • Sirrs, Owen L. (2017), Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: Covert action and internal operations, London and New York: Routledge, p. 157, ISBN 978-1-138-67716-6, LCCN 2016004564,  Fortunately for ISI, another option emerged from quite unexpected direction: the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Frong (JKLF). A creature of its times, the JKLF was guided by a secular, nationalistic ideology, which emphasized the independenc of Kashmir above union with Pakistan or India. This fact alone meant that JKLF was not going to be a good match for ISI's long-term goal of a united Kashmir under the Pakistan banner. Still, in lieu of any viable alternative, the JKLF was the best short-term expedient for ISI plans.
    • Webb, Matthew J. (2012), Kashmir's Right to Secede: A Critical Examination of Contemporary Theories of Secession, London and New York: Routledge, p. 44, ISBN 978-0-415-66543-8,  The first wave of militancy from 1988 through to 1991 was very much an urban, middle-class affair dominated by the secular, pro-independence Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).
    • Thomas, Raju G. C, ed. (4 June 2019), Perspectives On Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia, London and New York: Routledge, ISBN 978-0-367-28273-8,  The exception in this case, which is also the largest group among the nationalists, is the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). The JKLF claims to adhere to the vision of a secular independent Kashmir. ... The JKLF committed to an independent but secular Kashmir, is willing to take the Hindus back.
    • Chandrani, Yogesh; Kumar, Radha (2003), "South Asia: Introduction", The Selected Writings of Eqbal Ahmad, New York and Oxford: Columbia University Press, p. 396, ISBN 0-231-12711-1,  Decades of misrule and repression in Indian-held Kashmir had led to a popular and armed uprising in 1989. In its initial stages, the uprising was dominated by the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), a secular movement that demanded Kashmir's independence from Indian rule. The Indian government deployed the army and brutally suppressed the uprising. The Pakistani security establishment at first supported the JKLF and then began to seek more pliable allies.
    • Sokefeld, Martin (2012), "Secularism and the Kashmir dispute", in Bubandt, Nils; van Beek, Martijn (eds.), Varieties of Secularism in Asia: Anthropological Explorations of Religion, Politics, and the Spiritual, London and New York: Routledge, p. 101–120, 109, 114, ISBN 978-0-415-61672-0,  (p. 109) Like the Plebiscite Front, the JKLF portrayed the Kashmir issue as a national issue and Kashmir as a multi-religious nation to which Muslims, Hindus and members of other religions belonged. While Pakistan was considered as a 'friend' of the Kashmiri nation, the purpose of the JKLF was not accession with the state but the independence of Kashmir from both India and Pakistan. In the mid-1980s, the JKLF became a significant force among (Azad) Kashmiris in Britain. Towards the end of the decade, with the support of Pakistani intelligence agencies, the JKLF extended into Indian administered Kashmir and initiated the uprising there. (p. 114) In writings about the Kashmir dispute, secular political mobilisation of Muslim Kashmiris is frequently disregarded. Even when it is mentioned it is often not taken seriously. ... The Kashmir issue is much more complex than the orthodox view on the problem concedes. It is neither simply a conflict between India and Pakistan nor an issue between religion/Islam on the one hand and secularism on the other. ... In the 1980s and early 1990s Kashmiri nationalists, especially those of the JKLF, considered Pakistan a kind of natural ally for their purposes. But when Pakistani agencies shifted their support to Islamist militants ('jihadis') in Kashmir, most nationalists were alienated from Pakistan.
    • Sharma, Deepti (2015), "The Kashmir insurgency: multiple actors, divergent interests, institutionalized conflict", in Chima, Jugdeep S. (ed.), Ethnic Subnationalist Insurgencies in South Asia: Identiies, interests and challenges to state authority, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 17–40, 27–28, ISBN 978-1-138-83992-2,  The JKLF, with its indigenous roots, had insider credentials and its secular ideology appealed to a population that had learned to equate ethnic nationalism with Sheikh Abdullah's version of Kashmiriyat. After the insurgency was in full swing, the Islamist groups made progress with their superior experience in militancy and greater resources. At this point, the JKLF's secular ideology and its popularity became an obstacle in their path to complete control of the insurgency. In 1992, Pakistan arrested more than 500 JKLF members, including Amanullah Khan, a JKLF leader in PoK. It is alleged that Pakistan also provided intelligence on JKLF members to the Indian military, which led to the JKLF members being either arrested or killed.
  5. ^
    • Ganguly, Sumit (2016), Deadly Impasse: Indo-Pakistani Relations at the Dawn of a New Century, Cambridge University Press, p. 10, ISBN 9780521125680, In December 1989, an indigenous, ethno-religious insurgency erupted in the Indian-controlled portion of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir.
    • Ganguly, Sumit (1997), The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War; Hopes of Peace, Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, pp. 107–108, ISBN 9780521655668, However, two factors undermined the sense of security and safety of the pandit community in Kashmir. First, the governor hinted that the safety and security of the Hindu community could not be guaranteed. Second, the fanatical religious zeal of some of the insurgent groups instilled fear among the Hindus of the valley. By early March, according to one estimate, more than forty thousand Hindu inhabitants of the valley had fled to the comparative safety of Jammu.
  6. ^ Evans 2002, pp. 19–37, 23: "While the numbers of dead and injured were low, militant attacks between 1988 and 1990 induced panic within the Pandit community. There was widespread fear and a sense of impending trouble, fuelled by extremist propaganda on both sides. By late March 1990, the ASKPC (All India Kashmiri Pandit Conference) was appealing to the administration to assist Pandits in ‘shifting to Jammu’."
  7. ^ Cite error: The named reference metcalf&metcalf-exodus was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  8. ^ Hussain, Shahla (2018), "Kashmiri Visions of Freedom", Kashmir: History, Politics, Representation, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 89–112, 105, ISBN 9781107181977, The rhetoric of aazadi[disambiguation needed] did not hold the same appeal for the minority community. The rise of insurgency in the region created a difficult situation for the Kashmiri Hindu community, which had always taken pride in their Indian identity.
  9. ^ Hussain, Shahla (2018), "Kashmiri Visions of Freedom", Kashmir: History, Politics, Representation, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 89–112, 105, ISBN 9781107181977, The community felt threatened when Kashmiri Muslims under the flag of aazadi openly raised anti-India slogans. The 1989 targeted killings of Kashmiri Hindus who the insurgents believed were acting as Indian intelligence agents heightened those insecurities.
  10. ^ Evans 2002, pp. 19–37, 23: "KPs migrated en masse through legitimate fear. Given the killings of 1989 and 1990, and the ways in which rumour spread fast in the violent conditions of early 1990, might KPs have been terrified by uncertainty as much as by direct threats? There was collective unease at the situation as it unfolded. While the numbers of dead and injured were low, militant attacks between 1988 and 1990 induced panic within the Pandit community. There was widespread fear and a sense of impending trouble, fuelled by extremist propaganda on both sides. By late March 1990, the ASKPC (All India Kashmiri Pandit Conference) was appealing to the administration to assist Pandits in ‘shifting to Jammu’."
  11. ^ Hussain, Shahla (2018), "Kashmiri Visions of Freedom", Kashmir: History, Politics, Representation, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 89–112, 105, ISBN 9781107181977, In the winter of 1990, the community felt compelled to mass-migrate to Jammu, as the state governor was adamant that in the given circumstances he would not be able to offer protection to the widely dispersed Hindu community. This event created unbridgeable differences between the majority and the minority; each perceived aazadi in a different light.
  12. ^ Talbot, Ian; Singh, Gurharpal (2009), The Partition of India, New Approaches to Asian History, Cambridge University Press, pp. 54, 136–137, ISBN 9780521672566
  13. ^ Bose, Tapan; Mohan, Dinesh; Navlakha, Gautam; Banerjee, Sumanta (31 March 1990), "India's 'Kashmir War'", Economic and Political Weekly, 25 (13): 650–662, JSTOR 4396095
  14. ^ Habibullah, Wajahat (2008), My Kashmir: Conflict and the Prospects of Enduring Peace, United States Institute of Peace Press, p. 73, ISBN 1-60127-031-3
  15. ^ a b c d Sebastian, Meryl (15 March 2022). "Kashmir Files: Vivek Agnihotri's film exposes India's new fault lines". BBC News. Retrieved 15 March 2022.
  16. ^ Poddar, Umang (17 March 2022). "How the BJP is promoting 'The Kashmir Files': Modi's endorsement, tax breaks, leave from work". Scroll.in. Retrieved 18 March 2022.
  17. ^ Akhil, Kumar (18 March 2022). "How 'The Kashmir Files', Praised By PM Modi, Became A Runaway Success". NDTV. Retrieved 2022-03-20.
  18. ^ Cite error: The named reference Quint review was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  19. ^ Cite error: The named reference TKFDH was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  20. ^ Cite error: The named reference pinkvilla was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  21. ^ [18][19][20]
  22. ^ a b c Kumar, Anuj (14 March 2022), "'The Kashmir Files' movie review: A disturbing take which grips and gripes in turns", The Hindu
  23. ^ Cite error: The named reference Shilajit Mitra was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  24. ^ [15][22][23]
  25. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference Shubhra Gupta was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  26. ^ a b "'The Kashmir Files' is Hindutva's latest anti-Muslim weapon". The Siasat Daily. 14 March 2022. Retrieved 16 March 2022.
  27. ^ [25][22][26]
  28. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference Al Jazeera was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  29. ^ [28][15][22][25][26]
  30. ^
    Jafri, Alishan; Raj, Kaushik (22 March 2022), "We ID'd Anti-Muslim Sloganeers at 'The Kashmir Files' Screenings. What We Found Won't Surprise You", The Wire
  31. ^ "The Kashmir Files: Videos of Anti-Muslim Hate, Slogans in Theatres Go Viral". TheQuint. 2022-03-17. Retrieved 2022-03-24.

Banned in other countries

Singapore banned this film: https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/films/news/singapore-bans-kashmir-files-india-muslims-b2075380.html#amp_tf=From%20%251%24s&aoh=16521868230783&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com&ampshare=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.independent.co.uk%2Farts-entertainment%2Ffilms%2Fnews%2Fsingapore-bans-kashmir-files-india-muslims-b2075380.html Pr0pulsion 123 (talk) 12:48, 10 May 2022 (UTC)

Kindly remove

Kindly Remove non fact based conclusive assumptions and personal opinions like usage of terms "fictional storyline", "inaccurate", "conspiracy theories".

The information stated is of biased selective nature and partial. Whereas the documentary is based on interviews with both the affected community and local muslim population. The documentary is depicting the truth with changed character names and portrayed emotions. It can be feasible to assume that the timeline and few dialogues can be considered fictional but calling the whole film "fiction and conspiracy" is apathy and intentional.

Therefore the request is to remove the terms that are not fact based and without citation to verified validated sources like that of bbc and other renowned press.

BBC article stating an estimate of 300000 displaced Hindus. And refers to the armed insurgency erupted in Kashmir.[1]

BBC article refering to militant activities and atrocities faced by Kashmiri Hindus.[2]

Indiangengiskhan (talk) 13:40, 10 May 2022 (UTC)

Indiangengiskhan, Wikipedia is written by summarising reliable sources. Please read through the policy pages posted on your user-talk page.
Regarding the BBC articles you mention, the figure of 300,000 is not supported by scholarly sources. WP:NEWSORG are only reliable for news, not for summative information of this kind.
There is no contest that Kashmiri Hindus faced militant attacks. I will check if we say it properly. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:54, 10 May 2022 (UTC)
Version 2 says: The film portrays the exodus of Kashmiri Hindus as genocide and ethnic cleansing, hushed up by a conspiracy of silence. Scholarship on Kashmir, noting low Hindu fatalities, discusses such claims in the context of conspiracy theories or notions of victimhood.
Ethnic cleansing and genocide drove the exodus. The film is neither factual enough nor sophisticated enough to get into the topic of insurgencies, let alone those with secular aims, not religious ones. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 21:31, 10 May 2022 (UTC)
Roy Chowdhury, Debasish (30 March 2022), "The Kashmir Files: How a New Bollywood Film Marks India's Further Descent into Bigotry", Time,  The 'truth' that the film claims to reveal is that there was a "genocide" of Pandits in the 1990s, hidden by a callous ruling establishment and a servile media. Pandits were killed in their thousands, it claims, and not in the low hundreds as the government and Kashmiri Pandit organizations have stated.
From the Time magazine review Fowler&fowler«Talk» 21:53, 10 May 2022 (UTC)

I get you but would request you to go through the article below, has reliable source references.

Exodus[1]

I personally don't believe government figures since they are released to appeal to masses and hide their shortcomings along with entertaining certain audience as per political demand. And for a fact I know hundreds of Displaced Kashmiri Hindus that have lost someone in the genocide and many Kashmiri Pandit organizations (outside Kashmir) having member size more than 200, which brings us to the point that there is no single point organization for Kashmiri migrants and that the claim of one cannot be used to belittle the claims of others. Either due to pressure or personal, political,other vested interests that one might have at some point of time. Therefore it is a sincere request to check more on it. Indiangengiskhan (talk) 04:30, 11 May 2022 (UTC)


A Long Dream of Home: The persecution, exile and exodus of Kashmiri Pandits [2] Indiangengiskhan (talk) 06:14, 11 May 2022 (UTC)

Singapore ban

I see that sources are stating that Singapore banned the film.[1] However, the government's respective departments' statement reads as the "film will be refused classification".[2] Did it become as effective ban or is it in process to be implemented in [a near-] future, and how to does it fare with WP:CRYSTAL for future events in such case?

References

  1. ^ Reuters (10 May 2022). "Singapore bans controversial Kashmir film praised by India's Modi". Reuters. Retrieved 11 May 2022. {{cite news}}: |last= has generic name (help)
  2. ^ "'Provocative and one-sided': The Kashmir Files movie banned in Singapore". CNA (TV network). 9 May 2022. Retrieved 11 May 2022.

DaxServer (t · m · c) 09:18, 11 May 2022 (UTC)

I think it is effectively banned. The refusal of certification will probably be in a private letter, which might remain private. Since they issued a public statement, it is fine for us to go with how the RS judged it. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:34, 11 May 2022 (UTC)
It has been denied a rating or classification, which in Singapore is issued by the government and is a precondition for release. Singapore, a highly advanced, literate, multiracial, multiethnic, multi religious society doesn’t have a large segment of its population looking for magical escapes from grinding poverty in the cynical fantasies of religious nationalism. They have disallowed its release.
Given their eloquent prime minister’s earlier statement in parliament, the don’t need, as Milton might have said, glowing embers that teach light to counterfeit a gloom. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 11:22, 11 May 2022 (UTC)
@Fowler&fowler it is an effective ban as the producers cannot release it there. Venkat TL (talk) 12:10, 11 May 2022 (UTC)

UK and Australian certifications

These two lack references to substantial coverage as set in WP:FILMRATING. Please help in finding whether there's coverage for them, if not, they'd just fall under "indiscriminate identification of ratings" which the former guideline asks to avoid — DaxServer (t · m · c) 11:00, 11 May 2022 (UTC)

The British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) found the film to contain "strong bloody violence" and certified the film as suitable only for viewers aged 15 years and over. ref name="BBFC" /

Only certifications in the major markets are listed. If it was getting Universal certificate It would be ok to ignore the mention, it did not get U. Moreover the line above talks about Australia without listing Australian certificate. Content has been restored. Adding removing a line does not cause size issues. the info is encyclopedic and the reader gets an idea that the certification are comparable in different major markets. Please dont go overboard in removing relevant to reader information. Pretty sure the British papers discussed its certification. Feel free to expand. --Venkat TL (talk) 12:18, 11 May 2022 (UTC)

Sources

Why is the left leaning sources are used in article like scroll, thewire quint etc. which are mostly biased Specially for the violence which happened on Ram Navami. Bharat0078 (talk) 14:24, 8 May 2022 (UTC)

WP:RSN is the proper venue for these discussions since you are challenging the reliability of an entire media organization. Thanks, TrangaBellam (talk) 14:28, 8 May 2022 (UTC)
You can try to contribute balanced content to Wiki pages by using Mainstream sources like IndianExpress, TimesofIndia, etc. Jhy.rjwk (talk) 02:33, 14 May 2022 (UTC)

Disputed region of Kashmir

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shikara_(2020_film) Here it says "exodus of Kashmiri Pandits from Kashmir Valley" But when I tried to correct that in the Kashmir files movie from disputed Kashmir region to Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir @User:DaxServer banned me from editing. Why? Bharat0078 (talk) 14:12, 8 May 2022 (UTC)

@Bharat0078 Because you probably violated Wikipedia's neutral policy. You tried to make kashmir sound like it was an integral part of India. You should've written Indian Administered Jammu and Kashmir. Pr0pulsion 123 (talk) 12:51, 10 May 2022 (UTC)

But disputed region of Kashmir is there which means entire Kashmir region Indian and Pakistani but the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits happened from the Indian Kashmir and in perticular from the Kashmir valley and not from entire Kashmir. I propose to change it to Kashmir valley of Indian Jammu and Kashmir. Bharat0078 (talk) 14:07, 10 May 2022 (UTC)

Looking at the main article Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus, the lead says – from the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley in Indian-administered Kashmir following rising violence in an insurgency – so I guess, we could put the same as – "centered around an exodus of Kashmiri Hindus from Kashmir valley in Indian-administered Kashmir" – here (no opinion on the rest of qualifiers atm - Muslim-majority, insurgence - but I think they add the context in full, hopefully [already] explained in the body). I haven't looked at the refs on that page, but perhaps either or all of @Kautilya3 and Fowler&fowler: could help with the refs? — DaxServer (t · m · c) 14:30, 10 May 2022 (UTC)
I think "Indian-administered Kashmir Valley" should be enough. We are loading rather too much into one sentence otherwise.
A more serious problem is that the "insurgency" has been relegated to a citatiion. But it needs to be in the sentence. Without it, it is entirely perplexing how an "exodus" could become a "genocide". -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:37, 10 May 2022 (UTC)
Agree with K3, its important to mention violent insurgency/militancy faced by KPs in the lead paragraph, which has been completely removed in the current version. Some editors are trying to hide the context of the KP exodus. Jhy.rjwk (talk) 02:38, 14 May 2022 (UTC)

What is wikipedia neutral policy? A king(Hari singh) who seeks help from a country (India) to save his land from Pakistan (Kabali attack) and in return that king is ready to be part of the country (India) who will help him. I guess USA should also return Alaska to Russia if you feel it was the mistake from leaders that time. Rahulmam (talk) 04:46, 15 May 2022 (UTC)

Genocide of Kashmiri Pandits

How can wiki allow to write this as a notion which is considered inaccurate. Some wikipedia page itself talks about exodus of Kashmiri pandits. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exodus_of_Kashmiri_Hindus You must remove either of the pages. Rahulmam (talk) 04:39, 15 May 2022 (UTC)

This page is about a feature film. It is written as per Wikipedia policies. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:12, 15 May 2022 (UTC)

If this page is about a feature film why it has written that: "It depicts the early 1990s exodus[10] to be a genocide,[16] a notion that is widely considered inaccurate and associated with conspiracy theories". Here wikipedia is trying to present facts which contradicts some of its own wiki pages as i mentioned above. Rahulmam (talk) 14:38, 15 May 2022 (UTC)