Talk:Pro se legal representation in the United States/Kay Sieverding case law 6

Corfield v. Coryell,(6 F. Cas 546, 551-552, No. 3, 230 (1823) privileges and immunities clause cited by AJS Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry.Co, (207 U.S. 142, 28 S. Ct. 34,34 (1907) privileges and immunities clause cited by AJS Faretta v. California [422 that:806, 830, 95 S.Ct 25 (pro se generally as well as criminal) WINKELMAN V. PARMA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 127 S. Ct. 1994 (U.S. 05/21/200725, 2539 n 39] (pro se parents of disabled child) Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). (pro se attorney bills) National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Meese, 615 F. Supp. 200, 206 (District of Columbia District Court 1985) (cited by AJS_) "'One of the basic principles, one of the glories, of the American system of justice is that the courthouse door is open to everyone--the humblest citizen, the indigent, the convicted felon, the illegal alien...That principle of access to the courts consists not merely of the right to file a complaint but it includes the right to file other papers, including motions apprising the court of possible changes in the facts, the law, or the position of the litigant". JONES v. BOCK U.S. 549 01/22/07 No. 05–7058 U.S. Supreme Ct. SHELLEY V. KRAEMER 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (14th amendment in courts) VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. GRACE OLECH No. 98–1288 U.S. Supreme Ct., 2000. (14th amendment) Hlavinka v. Blunt, Ellis & Loewi, Inc. 174 Wis. 2d 381, N.W.2d (Ct. App. 1993 (absolute right of self-representation) SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO., L.P. V. APCC SERVICES, INC., No. 07-552 PATSY V. BOARD OF REGENTS OF STATE OF FLORIDA, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (courts are open for 1983) Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880) SHELLEY V. KRAEMER U.S. Supreme Court 355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W.2d 679, and 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638 (14th amendment) Tassian v. People, 731 P.2d 672 (Colo. 01/20/1987) (14th amendment refers specifically to pro ses) Seminole Tribe Of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (U.S. 03/27/1996) (concerns common law) See e.g. O’Keefe v. U.S. Postal Service, 318 F. 3d 1310, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 23061 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (federal Merit System Protection Board imposes special duty on administrative judges to assist claimants, to conduct fair and impartial hearings, and to interpret their arguments in the most favorable light); Lewis v. Novartis Nutrition Corp. & Comm’r of Economic Security, 2003 Minn App. LEXIS 320 (2003) (unemployment judge should assist unrepresented parties in the presentation of evidence, control the hearing so as to protect the parties’ right to a fair hearing, and ensure that the relevant facts are clearly and fully developed). One can only wonder at the dissonance between such American appellate decisions upholding statutory duties to provide assistance to ensure fair administrative hearings, and contrary rulings refusing to acknowledge their constitutional duty of judicial assistance to ensure due process and a fair and meaningful hearing in the context of court proceedings. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 (1982), quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 483, 485 (1969). 465 U.S. 168 (1984). Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications, Adv. Op. 1-97 532 U.S. 757, 121 S.Ct. 1801 (2001(“[N]ormally a judge should not “try a case” for a litigant who is wholly failing to accomplish the task. However, on the occasion where the [unrepresented] citizen has the simplest kind of matter [e.g., uncontested divorce, name change petition] to bring before the court, with no adversarial context, and no indication of any untoward motive or disrespect for the court, the judge has a duty and responsibility to not simply turn that citizen away on the basis of a minor failure to establish every pertinent detail. A judge’s ethical obligation to treat all litigants fairly obligates the judge to ensure that a pro se litigant in a non-adversarial setting is not denied the relief sought only on the basis of minor or easily established deficiency in the litigant’s presentation or pleadings”). Hardy W. RYLAND and Alma Odessa Ryland, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Alfred B. SHAPIRO, et al., Defendants, Edwin O. Ware and Edward E. Roberts, Jr., Defendants-Appellees. 708 F.2d 967 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957): "In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow ... the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972), the Supreme Court found in the first amendment a second constitutional basis for this right of access: "Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition." Id. 92 S.Ct. at 612. Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir.1979), where we stated: "It is by now well established that access to the courts is protected by the First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 336, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963); Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1363 (5th Cir.1983)First Amendment right to petition McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 6 (4th Cir.1972); First Amendment right to petition Harris v. Pate, 440 F.2d 315, 317 (7th Cir.1971); Pizzolato v. Perez, 524 F.Supp. 914, 921 First Amendment right to petition (E.D.La.1981); Crews v. Pertrosky, 509 F.Supp. 1199, 1204 n. 10 (W.D.Pa.1981)First Amendment right to petition Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Supreme Court defined the right of access in a civil rights action under section 1983 in the following terms The right of access to the courts, upon which Avery [Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969) ] was premised, is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights. It is futile to contend that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 has less importance in our constitutional scheme than does the Great Writ.Id. 94 S.Ct. at 2986. See also Mitchum v. Purvis, 650 F.2d 647, 648 (5th Cir.1981); Rudolph v. Locke, 594 F.2d 1076, 1078 (5th Cir.1979) Bounds v. Smith, 97 S.Ct. at 1495; see also Rudolph v. Locke, 594 F.2d at 1078. Sigafus v. Brown, 416 F.2d 105 (7th Cir.1969) (destruction by jail guards of legal papers necessary for appeal supports claim for damages under Sec. 1983); McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d at 6 ("Of what avail is it to the individual to arm him with a panoply of constitutional rights if, when he seeks to vindicate them, the courtroom can be hermetically sealed against him by a functionary who, by refusal or neglect, impedes the filing of his papers?") Crews v. Petrosky, 509 F.Supp. at 1204 ("An allegation that a clerk of state court has negligently delayed the filing of a petition for appeal, and that the delay has interfered with an individual's right of access to the courts, may state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.") Harris v. Pate, 440 F.2d 315, 317 (7th Cir.1971) (prison authorities may not place burdens on right of access to courts); Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 253 (2d Cir.1972). Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1155, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982). See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 735-36, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2708-09, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.1983) Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921, 82 S.Ct. 243, 7 L.Ed.2d 136 (1961) wrongful death action under sections 1983 and 1988 Dinwiddie v. Brown, 230 F.2d 465, 469 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 971, 76 S.Ct. 1041, 100 L.Ed. 1490 (1956)."if state officers conspire ... in such a way as to defeat or prejudice a litigant's rights in state court, that would amount to a denial of equal protection of the laws by persons acting under color of state law." Conduct by state officers which results in delay in the prosecution of an action in state court may cause such prejudice. Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931, 101 S.Ct. 1392, 67 L.Ed.2d 365 (1981) Delay haunts the administration of justice. It postpones the rectification of wrong and the vindication of the unjustly accused. It crowds the dockets of the courts, increasing the costs for all litigants, pressuring judges to take short cuts, interfering with the prompt and deliberate disposition of those causes in which all parties are diligent and prepared for trial, and overhanging the entire process with the pall of disorganization and insolubility. But even these are not the worst of what delay does. The most erratic gear in the justice machinery is at the place of fact finding, and possibilities for error multiply rapidly as time elapses between the original fact and its judicial determination.